We propose a framework of neurocognitive experiments that clarifies the mathematical structure of experiments and can be used to analyze experimental results and to determine the limitation of their possible interpretation. In contrast to the conventional analysis that employs simple Boolean logic, the present analysis treats classification in terms of higher-order functions. We also predict the existence of a previously unidentified type of neuron.
Introduction
The scientific method consists of a process of repeated observation, induction, deduction and verification (see Fig. (1) ). In this process, one observes objects or phenomena using a certain tool (a) and then attempts through inductive manner to construct a theory that can account for the experimental data (b). Next, predictions regarding other behavior are derived from the theory using deductive methods (c), and the theory is verified or refuted by comparing these predictions with the experimental data (d). The present study is motivated by the observation that this conventional scientific method has been applied to cognitiveneural systems by tacit agreement, although it has apparently been realized that there is a difficulty involved in the construction and application of theories and experiments that are capable of providing a clear understanding of such systems. Specifically, this difficulty stems from the problems involved in designing experiments that can extract information that effectively elucidates cognitive processes. This limitation is not a technical one, but intrinsic to the object of study itself, because the brain is a self-modifying [7] or constantly adapting system that is open to the environment in the sense of both energetics and informatics. This limitation appears, in particular, when one studies internal cognitive states.
- Fig. 1 One can endeavor to observe the brain's neural activities and from such observations attempt to describe cognitive functions, but there is no simple correspondence between these observed states with the internal states. The underlying limitation inherent in this process is due to several factors: the finite precision of measurements, the lack of an effective method of measurement and experimental devices, the fact that there is few proved neural correlates of cognitive process, the fact that there is no language common to the observer and the observed (animal), the relative nature of the observer's description and the internal states of the observed system, and so on. In addition, it is often difficult to properly interpret experimental data, and its misinterpretation can lead to serious misunderstanding. This difficult situation leads to the following general and well-known, but still important question:
How could an external observer obtain a formal description of unknown internal processes of an intellectual system such as inference and reasoning?
From the above considerations, it is clear that in the study of cognitive-neural systems what we need is a formal theory that can explicitly distinguish observed states from internal states and describe not only experimental data but also the potential range of observation, that is, an "observation space." Such a formal theory would be capable of determining the boundary representing the limit of possible interpretations of the neural data associated with a cognitive experiment. Our aim is to define the concept of the observation space and then consider the development of neurocognitive theory from this point of view.
Definition When the definite design of an experiment and a formalized description of its result are given, the observation space in the framework of the experiment consists of the entire set of both the experimental and theoretical results that the experimenter can potentially describe.
As a first step toward the construction of such a general theory, we attempt to develop the formalization of a typical neurocognitive experiment with monkeys as a case study. Though we here treat only a series of experiments conducted by Sakagami et al., we believe that our theory may reveal generic properties of this kind of observation space.
In §2, we briefly explain the essence of the experiment and present a set-theoretical formulation of this type of experiment. Despite the fact that the brain of a live animal is essentially open even during the experiment, in which the behavioral task to be carried out defines a limited environment, in this type of experiment, its observables are reduced to a finite set of relations. The finite observation space characterizing this kind of experiment is formalized in §3. The construct of the observation space allows for implicit assumptions behind the experiments to be made more explicit, and this makes the construction of successful theories and experiments more feasible. In §4, we formalize a potential deductive process that can be carried out as an internal process of the animal under study and derive the concept of discrimination of stimuli that it can perform. Section 5 is devoted to discussion of the implications of this case study. We discuss, in particular, the relationship between deductive inference and the deductive process that is derived "externally" from our formalization.
2 A case study for conditional discrimination tasks with multi-dimensional visual stimuli 2.1 The conditional discrimination tasks of Sakagami et al.
Sakagami et al. conducted a series of experiments on macaque monkeys performing certain behavioral tasks [10] , [11] , [12] . The animals were trained to discriminate between different types of multi-dimensional visual stimuli, that is, stimuli with multiple attributes, such as color, shape and motion. While the animals performed this task of discrimination, Sakagami et al. made single-unit recordings from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) [10] , [11] and from the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) [12] . As we see below, the task of dis-crimination can be formalized as a composition of two operations: the operation of selection, made according to the attributes of the stimuli, and the operation of transformation, carried out in accordance with the behavioral meaning. The attention process carried out by the animal during the performance of task is analyzed with this formalization. Before proceeding to the description of our theory, we explain the task that Sakagami and Tsutsui used in the experiments [11] .
- Fig. 2- The task employed by Sakagami and Tsutsui, which we here refer to as "ST task", is schematically depicted in Fig. (2) . In each trial, two visual stimuli are displayed successively on a monitor placed in front of the monkey. One of these stimuli, called the target stimulus (TS) is a multi-dimensional stimulus, possessing multiple attributes, such as color, direction of motion, and shape. The TS consists of random colored dots presented in a fixed area (aperture) of a certain shape. All the dots move in a single direction within this aperture.
Another stimulus, the cue stimulus (CS), is presented at the center of the monitor as a fixation spot. The color of the CS indicates the attribute of the TS which the monkey should attend during a given trial. In other words, the monkey has to "understand" the meaning of the color of the CS in each trial. In each trial, the monkey is presented a pattern. Each such pattern is in general characterized by the attributes of, for instance, motion, color and shape, but for a given trial, only one of them is "meaningful." The meaningful attribute is specified by the color of the fixation spot, namely, the color of the CS. The condition represented by the color of the CS is called the attending condition. (More specifically, the attending condition is fixed during a block, consisting of 32-64 successive trials.) For instance, if this color is yellow, then the meaningful attribute is color and the attending condition in this situation is called the color condition, if it is purple, the meaningful attribute is motion and hence the motion condition, and if it is red, the meaningful attribute is shape and hence the shape condition. The monkey is then trained to act in the manner described below, in accordance with the identity of the meaningful attribute.
The monkey initiates a trial by pressing a lever, and the CS then appears. There are two types of responses that the monkey can make, "go" and "no go", which are executed by continuing to press the lever and releasing the lever, respectively. The correct response depends on both the attending condition (the color of the CS) and the attributes of the TS.
The correspondence between the set of stimuli and the correct response type is fixed for each monkey. For each attribute, certain states correspond to the go response, and other states correspond to the no go response. For example, red means go, and right-directed motion means no go. Thus if a red, right-moving pattern is presented, the correct response is go under the color condition and no go under the motion condition.
After the monkeys were trained to perform the task with sufficient capability, which were assured with a probe test (see Ref. [10] ), a measurement of neuronal activity during the performance of the task was made in an attempt to identify a neural correlate with perception and behavior. The activities of over 500 neurons were recorded with a single microelectrode in the DLPFC. The average frequencies of neuron spikes over a number of trials (mean firing rates) were calculated for each neuron and for each kind of stimulus. The measured neurons were classified into certain groups according to the statistical significance of the difference between the mean firing rates.
Formulation of a multi-dimensional task
Here, we make the first formulation of the ST task studied by Sakagami and Tsutsui [11] .
Although in this section we restrict ourselves to the formulation of the task that the monkeys actually performed in the experiment, the theory we present can be applied to other types of experiments that involve conditional discrimination tasks with multi-dimensional stimuli.
Let the set X = {m, c} represent the attending conditions, where m and c denote the For simplicity, we call a given combination of stimuli (i.e. an element of X × Y ) a stimulus condition. Further, we denote the set of responses as Z = {g, n}, where g represents "go"and n represents "no-go".
In a given trial, the appropriate response is uniquely determined by a pair of stimuli, the CS and the TS. This relation from the stimulus to the response can be represented by a map
It is natural to consider the map f (x, y) ∈ Z as representing the behavioral meaning of the
Here, the map f has the special property that if the attending condition is fixed to m or c, the relation of the corresponding attribute Y m or Y c , to the appropriate behavior Z is also a map. Thus f is a map that consists of multiple maps from each attribute to a response.
These maps depend on the value of X. Let f i : Y i → Z be such a map of the attribute Y i (i ∈ {m, c}). Then, f can be expressed as
Classification of neurons
Now we consider the process of recording the neuronal activity. When the activity during a trial of the task is recorded, the relations among the stimulus condition (x, y) ∈ X × Y , the behavioral meaning z ∈ Z, and the activity of a cell are treated. Because the data presented in Ref. [11] were analyzed only for "correct" responses (i.e. the case z = f (x, y)), the reported results are obtained in reference only to each stimulus condition (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
A statistical test of the mean firing rate of each cell was introduced to determine whether or not the activity differs between the stimulus conditions. The recorded neurons considered in Ref. [11] can be classified into 16 classes, as determined using the analysis of variance (Fig. (3) ). The classes we refer to as MI and CI in Ref. [11] are In Ref. [11] , the responses of M, C and CM cells were also investigated in the case that the "shape" attribute was added as a factor of the multi-dimensional stimulus (TS). This shape attribute corresponds to the shape of the aperture, which consisted of stripes or a diamond in their experiments. In this case, X and Y can be redefined as X = {m, sh, c} In the next section, we further formalize, in a more generalized way, the stimulus-response relations of a subject who performs behavioral tasks that have already been learned, and also the situation that the activity of the brain is recorded. This allows us to define the concept of discrimination and show that the set of all discriminations can be considered the observation space of the task under consideration. We assert that with this formalization, it may also be possible to describe both the actual and potential results of such an experiment much more reliably than in the case of the conventional theory, and therefore that such a formalization will allow for relevant and testable predictions.
3 Observation space: A framework for the interpretation of the experimental results
S-R-A: stimulus, response and activity
Here we focus on a learning task that can be expressed by mapping relations from stimulus to response, that is, we consider the idealized situation in which the subject's behavior is determined only by external stimuli. Let S and R be a finite set of stimuli and a finite set of responses (or behavior ), respectively. Then, the experimenter induces the subject to perform action that can be represented by a map f : S → R. Furthermore, let A denote a set of neural activity that can be recorded from the subject's brain. Thus, in each of N trials of the experiment, the experimenter records a triplet of quantities consisting of the stimuli, response and activity:
usually in this kind of experiment, it is assumed that any correlations between trials can be ignored, and thus each trial is considered to be independent. The distributions of quantities of (s, r, a) ∈ S × R × A are then analyzed. Although there can be many relations among elements of this triplet, we here restrict ourselves to a map from a pair consisting of the stimulus and the response to the neural activity: F : S × R → A, taking into account of the experiment to be concerned in this paper. This means that we can only study activity with respect to the product space of stimulus and response, S × R.
Because it is practically impossible to describe the state of the entire nervous system, measurements are taken from certain specific parts of the nervous system, focusing only on certain specific quantities. For example, the activity is measured as the mean firing rate of a single neuron, which we consider to be elementary unit. Here we refer to such an elementary unit a measurement unit, or simply a unit.
Discrimination of stimulus-response through activity
If the neurons are classified, on the basis of some kind of the statistical significance of the difference between the average activities for all stimulus and response pairs, forming S × R, In our framework, the focus is not the neuronal activity itself, but, rather, the "discrimination" realized in the product space, S × R, through the measured activity of a unit. To represent this properly, we define the concept of discrimination induced by a map.
Definition For a given map φ : U → V , a discrimination on the domain U induced by the map φ is an equivalence relation
(In standard terminology, such an equivalence relation is referred to as a "classification".) Though the range set V (or the image φ(U ) ⊆ V ) may have some algebraic structure (for example, order), this definition of the discrimination does not take any such structure into account. This concept of the discrimination represents all the information that can be described if only the equality between elements of the set is taken into account. Thus, given a map between sets, that which can be realized on the domain set is represented by this discrimination. Moreover, note that the correspondence between a map and a discrimination is not one-to-one.
In the case that φ is a map from the product space of the stimulus and response to the observed activity of a measurement unit, only the discrimination induced by the map provides a method to extract meaningful information within the present framework. More precisely, for a map F : S × R → A that represents the activity of a unit with regard to stimulus and response, the discrimination D F on S × R induced by F represents the distinctions between the elements of S × R that can be obtained from A. Before continuing, we note here that the above definition can also be applied to the case of multiple measurement units. (Note that a discrimination realized in the case of multiple measurement units is a refinement of a discrimination realized with any single one of these units (see §3.3).)
If only "correct" responses are considered, as in the case of the previously studied ST task, according to the map f : S → R, the activity that we study here can be expressed as a map from S only. The measurement of such activity is considered to be a discrimination induced by a mapF :
Although it is an interesting problem to investigate what happens if we also include "incorrect" responses, here we treat only correct responses.
Partition lattice as an observation space for finite S-R relations
The set of all discrimination on a finite domain U (i.e. all quotient sets on U ) constitutes a partially ordered set ordered by refinements. This partially ordered set is called a partition lattice [3] (Fig. (6) ).
- 
Definition Let U be a finite set containing k = |U | elements. Because we can consider a discrimination for a finite relation defined by a map from S ×R to A, the neuronal activity observed in an experiment can be placed at a certain point in the partition lattice. Thus the observation space of such an experiment can be considered the partition lattice when this discrimination constitutes all the information that can be obtained in the experiment.
Considering the scheme described in Fig. (1) , the concept of the observation space helps us construct a framework on the space of observed data (the upper-right box in the figure) with respect to which the experiment is characterized. In actual experiments, however, information regarding an internal process of the subject is obtained not only through discrimination of the activity but through other observables as well, including the latency, the power spectrum, correlations, mutual information and anatomical structure. We ignore such other factors in the present formalization, in order to extract important information derived from the behavior of observables that have been treated in conventional neurophysiological experiments.
Deductive process and intermediate expression
In the present paper, we use the term deductive process in an operational or behavioral sense;
that is, we do not take into account purely internal inference processes (including unconscious processes), but we do take into account the process of the subject's response to externally imposed conditions. Let us consider the situation in which the selection process of the response R given certain stimuli S consists of multiple stages. In this case, the deductive process should consist of a composition of sub-processes representing some intermediate stages.
With the above operational definition, we regard a deductive process as an application of some externally observable rule, which is expressed by a map φ from a set of inputs (stimuli)
S to a discrimination D φ . Thus, when an input S is given, the deductive process is identified with a discrimination on S. Similarly, for any finite set T , a process associated with any map ψ : T → T (where T is an arbitrary set) is expressed as a discrimination D ψ on T .
Hence, an intermediate stage of the process is also identified with a discrimination on S by an external observer who treats only "correct" trials whose responses are expressed by a map of S. We call this discrimination of an intermediate stage an intermediate expression.
The following propositions relate a process with multiple stages to the partial order rela-tion of a partition lattice. 
Roughly speaking, Proposition 1 implies that any deductive process defined in an operational sense is described as "climbing up" toward a coarser element on the partition lattice.
Apparently, an external observer describing the activity resulting from the stimuli S can only treat the discrimination on S, so that the amount of information on S that the observer can obtain should monotonically "decrease" as the process proceeds to later stages. The next proposition asserts that the integrated information of concurrently processed sub-processes corresponds to the meet of these discriminations on the lattice.
Proposition 2 Given φ 1 : U → V 1 and φ 2 : U → V 2 , for any finite set U and any sets 
Proof The equivalence φ(a) = φ(b) holds iff φ 1 (a) = φ 1 (b) and φ 2 (a) = φ 2 (b) for any by Z. In this case, the inference process that the subject is to carry out in the experiment can be expressed as the map,
which represents the "correct" correspondence of the stimuli to the responses.
In order to understand the potential substructure of f , we consider higher-order maps with one argument corresponding to f (this process is called the "Currying"). We adopt here two higher-order maps that can be obtained directly from f on the domain represented by the product X × Y :
The map g is described as that which chooses a map (Y → Z) from |X| = n maps, in a manner that depends on X, whereas the map h is described as that which chooses a map (X → Z) from |Y | = x∈X |Y x | maps, in a manner that depends on Y . As mentioned in §2, the inference process intended in the experiments conducted by Sakagami et al. is of the type Eq. (7). Therefore, f is restricted to express a conditional map such as Eq. (2). Then a domain determined by g(x) can be restricted to the corresponding attribute of the stimulus.
In other words, for any x ∈ X, there is a map
where p x denotes the projection of the product Y to Y x . By contrast, h is not restricted in this way. Under the map h, the mapping of the conditions to the response is carried out in parallel (i.e., simultaneously and independently) for all stimulus attributes. Although the internal processes of the subject may proceed in this manner, the inference process induced by the experimental condition used by Sakagami et al. seems to be represented by the process Eq. (7) rather than the process Eq. (8) . For this reason, we consider the case Eq. (7) in the following, although we cannot deny the possibility that there exist parallel processings like that described by Eq. (8), as well as others, even for conditional tasks.
We can further decompose g(x) : Y → Z into two maps representing the transformation process and the selection process. The transformation process consists of the conversion from a stimulus to a behavioral meaning Z, which is expressed by f x (x ∈ X) in Eq. (9), and the selection process consists of the projection of an attribute in accordance with the attending condition x ∈ X. If each of these processes is carried out as one stage of the total process, then there are two possibilities for this total process, one in which the selection process is first and the transformation process is second and one in which this order is reversed. These two cases are expressed as follows:
Here Y is the sum (disjoint union) of
, and
where
process of selective attention (cf., e.g., Ref. [6] ).
Note that the manner of decomposing the process f adopted here is not unique. In 
The possibility of verification through the observation of neural activity
If the experimenter could observe the neural activity A of the brain in a suitable manner, the discrimination D F induced by the map from the stimuli to the observed activity, F :
X × Y → A, should be identified with an intermediate expression described in §3. 4 . In order to understand this more clearly, let us consider the relation between two kinds of processes obtained theoretically, the early selection process and the late selection process, with the process derived from the experiment of Sakagami and Tsutsui [11] . In other words, the relationship between the classification of neuron groups given in §2.2 and the scenario suggested by latency analysis (Fig. (5) ) is the subject to be considered here.
- Fig. (8a) . Similarly, M + C gives the discrimination shown in Fig. (8b) .
Although the discrimination given by MI + SI + CI (Fig. (8a) ) is identical to the discrimination given by the transformation from the multi-dimensional stimuli Y to the multidimensional action Z, as shown in Fig. (7b) , it cannot be determined whether MI + SI + CI expresses the activity after or before the process of transformation to behavioral meaning, because all the maps f c , f sh , and f m were injections in the experiment under consideration [11] .
In other words, the discrimination induced by Y itself and that induced by Z were identical in that experiment. To clarify this point, further experiments employing many-to-one maps (see below) can be carried out. In the case that MI + SI + CI expresses activity after transformation to behavioral meaning, it can be concluded that late selection is suitable for the entire process. In this case, the transformation process should be carried out through the union of the intrinsic cells' activity, MI + SI + CI, and the successive selection process is consists of the supposed stage M + S + C cannot be ruled out. However, it is likely that the process as a whole is late selection, because the results of experiment reported in Ref. [12] indicates that most of the C cells respond to the behavioral meaning. Even in this case, the selection process would likely be carried out in multiple stages intervened by M + C. Thus, the selection process would be divided into a process executed along the ventral pathway (for the color and the shape conditions) and a process executed along the dorsal pathway (for the motion condition). Again, note that the splitting of the selection process into these two selection sub-processes is merely one among an infinite number of possibilities. However, our approach provides a suitable framework to compare and analyze such possibilities, rather than to derive a conclusion regarding this specific case.
Applicability of the theory
In the theory presented in this paper, for a certain behavioral task, we introduced the concepts of stimuli S, responses R, and activity A expressed as an S-R map relation, and we related them to intermediate expressions.
We associated the sets X ×Y and Z with the stimuli S and responses R, respectively, and we also provided the correspondence between the discriminations statistically differentiated by the firing rates of neurons averaged over trials and the discriminations differentiated by intermediate expressions. The classification of the sets X × Y and Z directly reflects the assumptions that we made. Furthermore, it is evident that information regarding the mean firing rate alone is not sufficient to obtain a useful description of the activity of neurons (e.g.,
Refs. [1] , [2] , [5] , [13] , [14] , [19] ). Our present framework itself is, however, independent of neural representations, such as various types of temporal coding.
Whenever an observer attempts to obtain a correspondence between the formalization of some phenomenon and the phenomenon itself, the ambiguity that stems from the observer's arbitrariness of discrimination is inevitable. Hence the results obtained from the present theory-as those of any theory-must be considered to be dependent on the hidden conditions, namely the tacit assumptions. Conversely, one of the most important advantages of the present formalization is to reveal such tacit assumptions.
Discussion
We constructed in the present paper a formal theory of tasks in neurocognitive experiments.
This formal theory can provide an appropriate description of conditions that are applied to experiments and extract the structure of internal cognitive process in relation with neuron's activity. Our approach has provided a new classification of discrimination at an animal's "cognitive" level. Conventional theories provide merely an identification in terms of Boolean logic, which is typically seen in association tests with pigeons, and other identifications using simple stochastic renewals of maps, which is typically seen in experiments on reinforcement learning in T-shaped mazes with rats. The present theory, on the other hand, provides another more dynamic identification in terms of higher-order maps.
In general, brain sciences should work to bridge the gap between the neuronal level and the functional level. Physiological approaches, which usually give rise to the reduction of function to neuronal characters, possess predictive ability concerning behavior at the neuronal level but lack, in general, explanatory power with regard to cognitive functions. On the other hand, cognitive approaches, whose extreme example is simple behaviorism, possess explanatory capability regarding cognitive function but lack predictive power concerning neuronal level phenomena [18] . Thus, physiological and cognitive levels provide descriptions at two opposite extremes.
The present theory provides a description at intermediate levels between these two extremes. To describe neural systems at various levels, a variety of dynamical models have been adopted. The present theory can be viewed as a dynamical model in the sense of clarifying animal cognitive behavior and related neuronal activity by providing various types of mappings and their relations restricted to a given neurocognitive experimental task. The present results thus represent an attempt to reveal the underlying mechanism. We actually demonstrated a method to formulate a cognitive experiment. Formulating the measurement and analysis of the task, we elucidated the "observation space." As one example, we associated two formal processes with early and late selection. This approach allows us to classify experimental situations systematically from an operational point of view. Furthermore, this work may also provide a framework for further experiments which may be capable of clarifying a mathematical structure of the process of discrimination of stimuli and that of transformation process of cognition to behavior.
Thus, the present theory may provide a concrete method for the interpretation of cognitive function in terms of brain activity, namely a scheme of hermeneutic device [4] . Such a formalization of the experimental context would make tacit assumptions explicit. If this scheme were sufficiently powerful, it would then be possible not only to use it in analyzing existing neurocognitive experiments but also in devising new experiments.
Although the present framework is predictive, it is "static" in the sense that it does not treat more complex dynamics of the brain and mind. As stated in a previous paper [17] , the dynamics of a description can be formulated using a certain type of functional map (see also Refs. [8] , [15] , [16] ). The use of such a map may provide a direction for the development of the present framework. In addition, if the formal language is sufficiently potent, it may provide a tool to describe the function of the system itself at another cognitive level. Such a capability is related to Rosen's "relational biology" [9] . These extensions of our framework are left to a future study.
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A.2 Correspondence with discriminations
Now, let us reconsider the statistical method and the results of the ST task described in §2.3
from the viewpoint introduced in §3. The 16 statistically distinct classes obtained using the 2-factor ANOVA (Y m and Y c ), displayed in Fig. (3) , do not have a simple correspondence with discriminations.
As mentioned in A.1, because it cannot be claimed that there is no difference between any two stimulus conditions, the possible correspondence between statistically distinct classes and discriminations must contain all the refinements of the discriminations. In other words, letting Π be the partition lattice consisting of all discriminations on some domain, and letting Γ be the subset of Π corresponding to a class, Γ must be a down-set of Π, that is, for any
A concrete correspondence is derived using the statistical model Eq. (16) . Let us denote the statement that a hypothesis H itself is true by the same symbol H, and its negation (i.e., the statement that H is false) byH. If we assume that no error of the first kind occurs, Finally, if the domain Y is merged with another factor that was not statistically tested in the ST experiment, such as the attending condition X, the correspondence between the classes and the discriminations becomes more complex. In this case, the correspondence between the classes and all possible relations between discriminations for different attending conditions should be considered. were presented on a computer monitor to a monkey. The CS specified the attending condition,
Figure Captions
i.e. the attribute of the TS to which the monkey should pay attention. The CS was also used as a fixation spot. The TS was a multi-dimensional visual stimulus, which appeared at one of four locations at random. The monkey responded by releasing or continuing to press a lever. Neural activity in the prefrontal cortex was recorded with a microelectrode. (b) Time sequences of trials for "go" and "no-go" responses. When the monkey pressed the lever, a trial started, and the CS was presented. After 1-2 s, the TS was presented for 200 ms. After 1-2 s from the stop of TS presentation, the light expressing CS was dimmed and remained dimmed during 1.2 s. In the case of "go" response, the monkey has to release the lever within this dim period. In the case of "no-go" response, the monkey has to continue pressing the lever during this period. 
